Martín Alessandro
Subsecretario de Gestión del Cumplimiento del Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires
A number of presidents have established “compliance units” or “delivery units” to help achieve their priority goals. There are positive experiences worth mentioning. However, economic and social objectives at national level depend not only on government action.
There are factors that transcend government control can alter any compliance planning. These include, for example, the international price of commodities, interest rates in the United States, economic activity in China, among others. In fact, these external factors tend to be more influential in presidents’ popularity rates than their public policy decisions.
By contrast, in the type of objectives set by local governments there appears to be more direct control over compliance chains. Based on a classic study on public administration, municipal governments have a higher percentage of “production organizations,” which focus on producing more clearly measurable goods or services attributable to their own action. Judging macroeconomic policy can be difficult, but knowing whether the streets are clean, parks are safe and public transport runs on time, is easier. Furthermore, such evaluations tend to be less dependent on ideological assessments made by each individual.
Therefore, delivery capacity is critical for sub-national governments. There are cases in Latin America at the state or provincial level, such as Pernambuco, Brazil, with documented experience and outstanding results in public safety and educational performance. At city level, there was no analysis of delivery practices in the region until now.
The study “Governing Cities: The Role of Governments and Delivery Units” seeks to bridge that gap. It describes the experience of six Latin American cities (Buenos Aires, Cali, Niteroi, Osasco, Recife and Rio de Janeiro) with relevant practices of improving compliance, analyzing them in perspective compared to Delivery Unit models (e.g. in the UK) and “PerformanceStat” in US cities.
In general, these units are institutionally located at the center of government, reporting directly to the mayor or chief of staff (or similar). They work with sectoral ministries to set relevant goals for the relevant term, with clearly defined indicators. They then coordinate progress monitoring bodies through data review and decision-making meetings. These stocktakes are the main instrument to ensure the focus on the goals prioritized by the Mayor.
In several Brazilian cities, much emphasis has been placed on increasing the execution capacity of infrastructure projects, through “project management offices” that use common project management methodologies to centralize and standardize monitoring of projects developed by different municipal government units.
Few cases use citizen oversight as an additional source of pressure to encourage achievement of the goals. Buenos Aires, with an online dashboard and frequent municipal accountability activities on government commitments, has placed the most emphasis on this aspect of the delivery model.
The study concludes with recommendations for cities interested in expanding their compliance capabilities. While the Latin American experience is incipient, there is an internationally proven roadmap.
A strict assessment of the impact of any management reform is difficult, but there is experimental or quasi-experimental evidence on the virtues of these models for government performance and in building citizen confidence. Therefore, they seem a promising option for Latin American local governments with growing responsibilities and demands.
